

How does NATO membership affect civil defence? Perspectives from Norway and Denmark.

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In an ongoing research project, FOI is investigating how Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO may affect the design of Sweden's future civil defence. Preliminary results indicate that NATO membership has had little impact on how civil defence in Norway and Denmark is being formed and that NATO's concept of civil preparedness cannot be easily transferred to Nordic conditions. On the other hand, Swedish and Finnish NATO membership will most likely alter the Nordic context from the perspective of security policy. New opportunities for in-depth co-operation are emerging, but before these opportunities can be fully exploited, the similarities and differences in the preparedness models, history and geography of the Nordic countries need to be illuminated through continued research and knowledge accumulation.¹

INTRODUCTION

Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership simultaneously in the spring of 2022. In a long-term perspective, this creates an opening for a hitherto unknown development of the strategic importance of Sweden's civil defence. This memo discusses a longer-term perspective on the link between security policy and the conditions for civil defence. The focus of security policy during the past two hundred years has been dominated by the pursuit of neutrality and nonalignment,² but Sweden is definitively abandoning this approach with its application to NATO. The turn in favour of being part of NATO will have major consequences for Sweden's strategic military planning and for Sweden's work with host nation support.³ But how will civil defence be affected, and what can we learn from our neighbours in this regard? Sweden's investments in civil defence during the 20th century had an important strategic function in relation to its security-policy objectives. The aim of civil defence was to strengthen and support Sweden's security-policy line by contributing to the country's total deterrence capability. For the civilian part of total defence, deterrence was maintained by building and promoting civilian resilience (*motståndskraft*), a concept that still appears in policy documents.⁴

During the Cold War, civil defence, economic defence (security of supply), and psychological defence were considered to be the basis of civilian resilience. All in all, the civilian parts, together with the military defence, would act as a deterrent and create freedom of action for



Figure 1. A woodcarving frieze depicting the dragon, Nidhogg, gnawing on the World Tree, displayed on the exterior façade of Oslo City Hall. In Norse mythology, Nidhogg represented the impending apocalyptic doom.

Source: Author's photo.

non-aligned Sweden. In this way, an important strategic dimension was built into the civilian parts of the total defence concept. In the event of war, there would also be a humanitarian and practical component, which was about protecting and saving the lives and health of citizens, even for extended periods and in blockade situations where Sweden would not be able to count on outside help. This is how nonalignment in peace and neutrality in war – security policy aspects, basically – were built into civil defence, leaving their mark on Swedish infrastructural investments, organisational models and material purchases for many decades.⁵

Now that Sweden's security policy stance has changed, at the same time as the Nordic countries are moving towards a common security policy context within the framework of NATO, how in turn is our view of the strategic and security policy function of civil defence changing? To answer that question, in spring 2023 we conducted visits, interviewing researchers and officials in Denmark and Norway, and examined how the NATO alliance has shaped Danish and Norwegian contingency planning. We have also conducted literature studies to examine NATO's structure and history in relation to the Nordic countries. This memo is limited to studying Denmark and Norway, chosen because of their geographical, historical and cultural similarities to Sweden. The next section's discussion of how civil preparedness and resilience are viewed within NATO, is followed by a brief description not only of how our neighbours have related to these issues, but also some basic differences between the Nordic countries. The subsequent section examines some preliminary conclusions about how Swedish NATO membership could affect the strategic outlook of civil defence, and how the Nordic Region, as a geopolitical entity, might affect the future development of Swedish civil defence.

What does NATO mean by "civil preparedness"?

NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance that is based on mutual defence obligations (Article 5).⁶ However, NATO is also based on a civilian commitment that relies on its members' maintaining and developing their resilience, or more precisely "their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article 3).⁷ NATO's point of departure is that resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment.⁸ According to NATO's 2021 renewed commitment to resilience, the allies need to strengthen their civil preparedness to increase their capabilities.⁹ In the NATO context, civil preparedness has three functions: "continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to

military operations."¹⁰ These three functions have been specified further through the formulation of baseline requirements.

There are some superficial similarities between NATO's concept of civil preparedness and the civilian component of Sweden's total defence.¹¹ Not least, NATO's concept of resilience is reminiscent of Sweden's key concept of resilience (*motståndskraft*), which was concretised in Sweden's 2021 Total Defence Decision, in the form of several specific sub-goals for civil defence capabilities. These include securing the most important societal functions, maintaining essential supplies and contributing to the military defence's capability in the event of armed attack or war in our neighbourhood.¹² However, this does not mean that civil defence, in the Swedish sense, actually has a NATO equivalent.¹³ There are several differences: the most important involves the purpose of resilience. While civil defence in Sweden, in addition to supporting defence efforts, also has a humanitarian mission to protect and safeguard its own population, NATO's notion of civil preparedness primarily aims to support the operations of NATO forces.¹⁴ Of course, the NATO perspective also includes helping affected civilian populations, but the core of Article 3 is based on the objective of ensuring operational capability for the benefit of the alliance's overall military objectives. In summary, this means that the basics of the construction of Swedish civil defence, from both the humanitarian and strategic perspectives, which include investments in civil-defence shelters or the build-up of emergency stockpiles to ensure security of supply, have no equivalent in NATO's concept of civil preparedness. It is also important to remember that NATO regards civil preparedness as a national responsibility. When translated into Swedish, baseline requirements (*baskrav*) are often interpreted as an absolute requirement from NATO in the same way as, for example, regulations and directives in the EU.¹⁵ However, what NATO means by baseline requirements is ultimately a matter of interpretation. Both resources and funding are available at national level. The cost of civil preparedness is not included in NATO's two-percent target.

Interviews with Norwegian and Danish emergency preparedness authorities and researchers revealed evidence of reasoning and several examples that illustrate the interpretative aspect of NATO's concept of civil preparedness. The differences between NATO and the EU as organisations were emphasised, as well as the fact that civil preparedness, in the sense of protecting one's own civilian population, is a national responsibility. In other words, joining NATO does not mean that national priorities and objectives for one's own preparedness become superfluous.

Theoretically, NATO membership could be interpreted as creating such a strong deterrent that the threat of acts of war against one's own population can be considered to have been reduced, as can the need for civil defence, in both strategic and humanitarian terms.¹⁶ But, at the same time, the interviewees emphasised, the state's ultimate responsibility for its population's safety and survival remains. Thus, at least superficially, NATO membership does not seem to have any direct and obvious impact on national civil preparedness.

The respondents had difficulty answering exactly how NATO membership has affected Norway and Denmark's civil contingency planning, since both countries have been members of NATO from its inception, in 1949. But the interviews make it evident that NATO has created a security-policy framework for both military and civil preparedness. In the same way that Swedish security policy in the Cold War period was shaped by the pursuit of nonalignment, Norwegian and Danish security policy has been shaped by NATO membership. The deterrent effect that Norway and Denmark have sought since the Second World War is ultimately considered to be based on NATO, and not on individual national-defence investments. At the same time, both the interviews and the literature emphasise that NATO is an intergovernmental alliance based on consensus decisions, which means that the individual countries constitute and shape NATO. The entry of new countries thus changes the alliance, since the new members also have the opportunity to influence NATO's direction, focus, and formulation of threat scenarios.¹⁷ To what extent NATO has actually shaped the Nordic countries is thus up for debate.

The fact that NATO's emphasis on civil preparedness is relatively new, from a historical perspective, is also evident from the interviews: experience from exercises in Norway shows that NATO still commonly assumes that "civilian" actors are mainly comprised of NGOs, that is, not the authorities or companies responsible for functions such as infrastructure and transport. Despite the fact that official NATO documents emphasise the importance of civil society for military capability, civilian actors have felt that, in exercises, they have to some extent been rendered invisible.

The differences between the Nordic countries

Even if Denmark and Norway have both been part of NATO since the start this does not mean that "civil defence" (here in the sense of non-military preparedness, in a broad sense) has developed in the same manner in the two countries. On the contrary, our neighbouring countries have chosen different paths in organising the non-military

aspects of preparedness.¹⁸ Basic concepts such as total defence, civil defence and civil preparedness also have different meanings and histories in the two countries. In Sweden total defence is defined by statute as both military and civil defence, in other words all activities needed to prepare the country for war. In Norway total defence refers specifically to mutual support between civil society and military defence across the whole threat spectrum, from peacetime crises up to war situations.¹⁹ In Denmark, the concept of total defence is associated with the Cold War and is considered obsolete.

There are corresponding differences in the countries' concepts of civil defence. In Sweden, civil defence does not refer to an organisation but to all civilian actors that are needed to protect the civilian population and assist the military defence with its defence efforts.²⁰ Norway does not use the concept of civil defence. The Norwegian term, *Sivilforsvaret*, refers to a specific organisation, which in peacetime, in the event of major accidents and natural disasters, has the task of assisting the emergency services with extra resources; and, in wartime, to protect the civilian population.²¹ In wartime, however, Norway's *Sivilförsvar* does not expect its personnel, who are protected by the Geneva Convention, to support the nation's military defence; this is in contrast to Sweden's civil defence, which has the explicit objective of providing such support. Although Sweden had a corresponding national civil-defence organisation during the Cold War, it was disbanded in the 1990s. Denmark uses neither the term civil defence (*civilt försvar*) nor civilian defence (*civilförsvar*). Since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has experienced a transition, characterised as the replacement of total defence with a decentralised "ad hococracy," emphasising cooperative relationships among different security actors.²² The linguistic similarities amongst the Scandinavian countries can partly conceal some of the conceptual and actual differences. This complicates comparisons and attests to different institutional traditions and historical legacies.²³

During our visits to Denmark and Norway, the discussions often revolved around the historical and geographical conditions of the various countries, and how they have shaped attitudes and ideas about preparedness more than NATO membership has.²⁴ Norway, with its North Atlantic perspective, for example, has traditionally, ever since the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905, turned its gaze westward towards the United Kingdom and the United States. Both the importance of merchant shipping and the historical experience of the years of occupation during World War II have strengthened Norway's Western ties. Norway's NATO membership, particularly the opportunity it provides for cooperation

with the United States, is still regarded as the foundation of the country's security policy.²⁵

Denmark's experience of years of occupation during the last world war have also led it to forge strong ties to the West within the framework of its NATO membership. In terms of security policy, Denmark has long seen the United States as its primary partner. This relationship was strengthened after the attacks of 11 September 2001, when Denmark chose an active role in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, in Afghanistan. At the same time, based on its geographical position in the Nordic region, Denmark has turned its attention, in terms of trade and communication, to the Baltic Sea and the continent.

The Scandinavian countries can also be distinguished according to their relationship with Finland. Sweden has cultivated very close cooperation with its eastern neighbour, for historical and security policy reasons, whereas neither Norway nor Denmark have the same tradition and close relationship with Finland that Sweden has.²⁶ The differences in the countries' perceptions thus seem to be more based on their respective histories, cultures, and geography than to the security policy context, in this case, created by NATO membership.

Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation also leads to the question of Nordic security policy co-operation in a broader sense, and the extent to which this has affected the countries' respective states of civil preparedness. Will a pan-Nordic NATO membership lead to changes? The fragmentation of Nordic security policy after the Second World War, as a result of the countries' different choices in relation to NATO and later the EU, has limited the opportunities for both military and civil defence cooperation. However, Nordic defence cooperation has seen various initiatives, not least through the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO).²⁷ The five Nordic countries also initiated the so-called Haga process in 2009, which is an additional special collaboration in crisis preparedness that focuses on Nordic cross-border co-operation in the area of societal security.²⁸ Interest in deeper cooperation in crisis preparedness has, however, varied, both over time and between countries.²⁹ According to the interviews, Sweden and Finland have pushed for greater cooperation at times, while interest in Denmark and Norway has fluctuated and at times been low. However, in light of the new security policy situation, Denmark appears to be shifting towards increased involvement in a Nordic context.³⁰ One conclusion from our interviews is that Nordic cooperation in civil preparedness is not going to be micromanaged by NATO, but will largely be run and developed by the Nordic countries themselves. Increased

Nordic cooperation is an area that still needs to be worked out. It may not only involve common practical challenges in logistics, transport and supply, but also more long-term strategic assessments, for example regarding development of threat assessments from a Nordic perspective.

The answer to the question: How does NATO membership affect our strategic view of civil defence?

Given that NATO's baseline requirements can generally be interpreted and implemented freely, and given the varying preparedness policies of the Nordic countries, despite NATO membership, a simple answer to the question of how NATO membership would affect the design of Swedish civil defence in the longer term could be: Almost not at all. Based on the meetings and interviews we conducted with researchers and officials in our closest neighbouring countries, in combination with consulting the literature available on NATO's development, it is clear that NATO's baseline requirements are more to be regarded as an expectation rather than as demands, as a way of drawing the attention of the member states to sensitive points that should be included in their planning. The explanation for why the Nordic countries' civil preparedness models have evolved as they have appears to involve various factors, where geography, history and institutional traditions appear to dominate, and where the security policy dimension (NATO included) is only one component.

At the same time, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership may challenge the national perspective, creating a situation in which the impact on the development of Sweden's civil defence could be significant. In a security policy context where the Nordic countries are part of the same alliance, the different civil preparedness models will need to be understood in a different way than before. The contribution of Swedish civil defence to the country's total resilience will in future also contribute to NATO's deterrence capability. In this way, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership will affect not only us but also Denmark and Norway, as NATO's border are shifting eastward. This development casts a new light on the Nordic countries' contingency planning and raises questions about how, collectively, their civil preparedness models can contribute to the region's overall resilience. As NATO regards resilience as part of the alliance's deterrence capability, it is likely that the strategic value of civil defence will not diminish in importance in the future, rather the opposite. However, exactly how much pressure there will be on the Nordic countries to sharpen and possibly coordinate their civilian resilience will most likely vary depending on

how the threat scenarios for European and other NATO countries change, as well as how much importance the Nordic countries, the Arctic and the Baltic Sea will be assigned in the future global security policy arena.

The main message of this report is thus not to be drawn from an individual national perspective but rather from the insight that the security policy dimension of each country's civil preparedness work will be related to a larger Nordic context. A Swedish NATO membership will probably lift the strategic dimension of civil defence from the national to a Nordic context. In the long run, the challenge for Sweden's civil defence will thus not necessarily be the implementation of NATO's baseline requirements at the national level, but rather the way in which our civil defence will function in harmony with the rest of NATO's Nordic members, and the frameworks that will be jointly designed for both military and civilian cooperation. These, in turn, will depend greatly on how NATO develops as an organisation. A more complex answer to how NATO membership would effect Sweden's civilian planning conditions in the long term could be that, although there may be little change from a national perspective, a common security policy framework for the Nordic countries could have a major impact on preparedness-related issues, and thus also on the direction of future civil defence policies. However, depending on how NATO develops, a common security policy framework for the Nordic countries could have a major impact on preparedness-related issues, and thus also on the direction of future civil defence policies.

The future of the Nordic region?

It is not self-evident that the concept of the Nordic Region is appropriate as a geographical framework for cooperation. Our interviews and meetings showed that despite cultural

similarities between the Nordic countries, each country has its own security policy interests that are not always easy to reconcile, such as a focus on the Arctic regions, Russian border areas, the North Atlantic, or the Baltic Sea. Differences between specific national concepts therefore constitute more than a linguistic problem, as they are linked to the security policy traditions of each country.³¹ This is not only negative, but can also be seen as an asset, for example in terms of the opportunities to complement each other with the specific perspectives and strengths that each country has created over time. However, differences in conditions and traditions need to be discussed and made visible. If security policy considerations are not based on an understanding of the basic traits of each country, there is a risk that important decisions and investments will meet resistance and ultimately fail.³²

If, for the first time in the modern era, all the Nordic countries are placed under a common security policy framework, Swedish and Finnish NATO membership offers a window of opportunity for cooperation.³³ Increased cooperation is something that is also in demand in both Denmark and Norway, but it must be actively pursued. Several already existing forms of cooperation within, for example, NORDEFECO, the Nordic Council and the Haga Agreement can be used to attain this. At the same time, the Nordic countries still have a substantial amount of work to do in terms of carving out areas of responsibility, establishing joint planning scenarios, conducting exercises together, and identifying shortcomings in coordination and communication. A common NATO structure, as well as a consensus on the need for cooperation in a troubled world, essentially creates favourable conditions for this work. ■

Endnotes

- 1 This report is a result of the project, “The Civil Defence ‘Threshold Effect’: Security-policy Dimensions of Civil Defence,” funded by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The project includes the conduct of semi-structured and group interviews with researchers and officials from, among others, Forsvarsakademiet (DK), Beredskapsstyrelsen (DK), DEMA (DK), Forsvarets forskningsinstitut (NO), Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, DSB (NO), Forsvarshögskolan (FI), Inrikesministeriet i Finland (FI) och Hanaholmen (FI). In 2023, twenty respondents were interviewed within the framework of the project.
- 2 For a summary of the topic, see Mats Bergquist’s comment in KKrVA’s documents and journal on Swedish security strategy from the 1800s onward: “Från Oscar I till Peter Hultqvist: Kontinuitet och kursjusteringar i svensk säkerhetspolitik efter 1812,” in *KKrVA Handlingar och Tidskrift*, 4 (2016): 161–182.
- 3 Zigne Edström & Emelie Thorburn, *Nordiskt operativt försvarssamarbete - före och efter ett svenskt och finskt Nato-medlemskap* [FOI Memo 8117] (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023); Beatrice Reichel & Daniel Jonsson, *Svenskt världsstödet: Kunskapsunderlag för civilt försvar med fokus på energi* [FOI-R-5441] (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023); William Alberque and Benjamin Schreer, “Finland, Sweden and NATO Membership.” *Survival* 64:3 (2022): 67–72.
- 4 Jenny Ingemarsdotter, *Civilt försvar: Vad och Varför?* [FOI Memo 8105] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023); also see Försvarsberedningen, *Motståndskraft: Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025*, [Ds 2017:66] (Försvarsdepartementet, 2017); for a review of the complexity of civil defence and its various functions, see Lawrence Vale, *The Limits of Civil Defence in the USA, Switzerland, Britain and the Soviet Union: The Evolution of Policies since 1945* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987).
- 5 During the Cold War, a civilian population without a resistance was regarded as an “Achilles’ heel” of total defence; see, for example, Carlbom et al., *Civil-militär samverkan och samordning i Sverige under efterkrigstiden* [FOI-R--0418-SE] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2002), p.10–12; also see Bennesved, *Sheltered society: Civilian air raid shelters in Sweden — From idea to materiality, 1918–1940 and beyond*, (Malmö: Universus Academic Press, 2020) p.121–122, 410–411.
- 6 See the government’s own description, <https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/sverige-och-nato/detta-ar-nato/> (accessed 2023-09-06).
- 7 During the past decade, civil society’s resilience and importance for military defence has received increased attention in NATO. In 2016, the leaders of NATO member states committed to improving the national resilience of their member states by striving to achieve baseline requirements for civil preparedness in seven different areas (*seven baseline requirements*). A “*Strengthened Resilience Commitment*” was formulated in 2021, which emphasised that “. . . national and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks, and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values,” Nato’s official website: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm (accessed 2023-09-06).
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid; also see NATO’s official theme page on civil preparedness and resilience, “Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for the Alliance’s collective defence, and NATO supports Allies in assessing and enhancing their civil preparedness.” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm (accessed 2023-09-06).
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Daniel Jonsson & Ester Veibäck, *Nato och svensk civil beredskap – Ett kunskapsunderlag med fokus på NATO Baseline Requirements och svensk energiförsörjning*, [FOI-R--4937--SE] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2020).
- 12 See Försvarsberedningen (2017), and Prop. 2020/21:30, p.89.
- 13 Unfortunately, there are two completely different meanings of “civil preparedness” in Sweden: on the one hand, NATO’s civil preparedness is translated as *civil beredskap* (civil preparedness), and on the other, MSB uses the same term, *civil beredskap* (which is not a statutory term) as an umbrella term for emergency preparedness and civil defence. NATO’s civil preparedness, which is based on the alliance’s baseline requirements, is thus something different from what MSB means by civil preparedness in the context of the Swedish system.
- 14 For example, it describes how the basic ability to handle “uncontrolled large population movements,” i.e., refugee flows, is intended to avoid their complicating NATO’s military movements: “Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO’s military deployments,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm (accessed 2023-09-06).
- 15 Mari Olsén & Ulf Jonsson, *Resonemang kring hur ett Nato-medlemskap kan påverka det svenska arbetet med civil beredskap*, [FOI Memo 8159] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023).
- 16 For example, in the late 1980s, Vale (1987) demonstrated large differences in spending on civil defence between the countries that were officially under the nuclear umbrella, and those that were not. This suggested that countries that sought to achieve deterrence more by military means were less likely to build capabilities with civilian solutions.
- 17 NATO has undergone a number of major metamorphoses since its inception; see, especially, Timothy A. Sayles, *Enduring alliance: a history of NATO and the postwar global order* (Cornell University Press, 2019); and Seth Johnston, *How NATO adapts: Strategy and organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017).
- 18 Sebastian Larsson & Mark Rhinard (eds.), *Nordic Societal Security: Convergence and Divergence* (Routledge, 2021); Henrik Breitenbauch & Alexander Høgsberg Tetzlaff, *Samfundssikkerhed i Danmark: Det robuste og sikre samfund I en ny sikkerhedspolitisk virkelighed* (Djøf forlag in collaboration with the Center for Militære Studier, 2022); also see James Kenneth Wither, “Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defence Concepts.” *Defence Studies* 20:1 (2020): 61–81.
- 19 Lovisa Mickelsson & Vidar Hedtjärn Swaling, *Förmågebedömning inom civilt försvar: Tre grannländers perspektiv på uppföljning och utvärdering av civil beredskapsförmåga* [FOI-R--5359--SE] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2023), p. 38; See also ”Boks 1.1”, in *Sikkerhetsloven, Meld. St. 5 (2020–2021) og Standard Norge (2021)*, p.11.
- 20 MSB 2023, “Det här är civilt försvar,” <https://www.msb.se/sv/forsvarsvilja/civilt-forsvar/> (hämtad 2023-09-06).

- 21 See the homepage of Norway's civil defence, <https://www.sivilforsvaret.no/dette-er-sivilforsvaret/> (accessed 2023-09-06).
- 22 Iben Bjørnsson, "Negotiating Armageddon: Civil Defence in NATO and Denmark 1949–59." *Cold War History* 23:2 (2022): 217–38; Breitenbauch & Høgsberg Tetzlaff (2022).
- 23 Larsson & Rhinard (2021), see, especially, p. 13–16.
- 24 For an overview of the respective security policy trends of the different Nordic countries during the second half of the 20th century, see Gunnar Åselius, "Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945"; Henrikki Heikka, "Republican Realism: Finnish strategic culture in Historical Perspective"; Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "What's the Use of It?: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force"; Nina Graeger & Halvard Leira, "Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: From Local to Global Perspective," all available in *Conflict and Cooperation: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 40:1 (2005), theme issue; also see Larsson & Rhinard (2021); and Göran Rydeberg, *Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitikens historia från 1800 till idag: En studie kring svenska och nordiska perspektivförskjutningar* (Santérus, 2020).
- 25 Meld. St. 5 (2020 – 2021) *Melding til Stortinget: Samfunnssikkerhet i en usikker verden* (Stortinget, 2020); Forsvarsdepartementet Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, *Støtte og samarbeid: En beskrivelse av totalforsvaret i dag*, (2018); also see Graeger & Leira (2005).
- 26 For interesting perspectives on the relationship between Sweden and Finland in literature, both historically and now, see Martin Hårdstedt *Finlands Svenska Historia* (Natur & Kultur, 2020), and Katarina Tracz (ed.) *Stronger together: Sweden and Finland on the Road Toward Nato* (Frivärld, 2023).
- 27 Edström & Thorburn (2023); Johan Engvall, Eva Hagström Frisell & Madelene Lindström, *Nordiskt operativt försvarssamarbete: Nuläge och framtida utvecklingsmöjligheter* [FOI-R--4628-SE] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2018).
- 28 Alyson JK Bailes & Carolina Sandö, *Nordic Cooperation on Civil Security: The 'Haga' process 2009–2014*, [FOI-R--3944-SE] (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2014); also see Larsson & Rhinard (2021).
- 29 Anders Ljunggren, "Krönika om nordiskt samarbete: Nordisk säkerhetspolitik förr och nu." *Nordisk tidskrift* 83:1 (2007), p. 73–76. For an overview of research, see Rydeberg, (2020).
- 30 Den sikkerhedspolitiske analysegruppe, *Dansk sikkerhed og forsvar frem mod 2035* (Forsvarsministeriet 2021), p. 53; also see Iben Bjørnsson, "Østersøen er Danmarks nye sikkerhedspolitiske mulighedsvindue" (Altinget, 2023). <https://www.altinget.dk/forsvar/artikel/adjunkt-oestersoen-er-danmarks-nye-sikkerhedspolitiske-mulighedsvindue> (accessed 2023-09-06).
- 31 Coordination within the Nordic Region has faced this problem for a long time; see, for example, Larsson & Dinard (2021).
- 32 A similar discussion on military cooperation is found in Edström & Thorburn (2023).
- 33 See, for example, Bjørnsson (2023); also see Fredrik Doeser & Joakim Eidenfalk, "The Importance of Windows of Opportunity for Foreign Policy Change." *International Area Studies Review* 16: 4 (2013): 390–406.

